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ABSTRACT. The precautionary principle (PP) aims to
anticipate and minimize potentially serious or irreversible
risks under conditions of scientific uncertainty. Thus it
preserves the potential for future developments. It has
been incorporated into many international treaties and
pieces of national legislation for environmental protection
and sustainable development. In this article, we outline an
interpretation of the PP as a framework of orientation for
a sustainable information society. Since the risks induced
by future information and communication technologies
(ICT) are social risks for the most part, we propose to
extend the PP from mainly environmental to social sub-
jects of protection. From an ethical point of view, the PP
and sustainability share the principle of intergenerational
justice, which can be used as an argument to preserve free
space for the decisions of future generations. Applied to
technical innovation and to ICT issues in particular, the
extended PP can serve as a framework of orientation to
avoid socio-economically irreversible developments. We
conclude that the PP is a useful approach for: (i) policy
makers to reconcile information society and sustainability
policies and (ii) ICT companies to formulate sustainability
strategies.
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Introduction
Novel technologies inspire in us the expectation of a
better life, but simultaneously they raise new risks.
The increasing power of innovation and accelerating
technical progress make it difficult to anticipate
environmental and social implications of novel
technologies in time (Meel and Saat, 2002; WBGU,
1998). There is ‘a growing tension between two
aspects of science: its growing innovative powers are
increasingly outrunning its capacity to anticipate the
consequences’ (EEA, 2001, p. 185).
After a long period of trust in technology, aware-
ness was raised in the 1970s of the risks of technology.
It became clear that technical progress not only
brings natural risks into the ambit of human decisions,
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but also at the same time creates new risks. New
technologies can have unacceptable side effects for
society. The term ‘risk society’, coined by Ulrich Beck
and given tangible form by the Chernobyl reactor
accident, symbolises a turning point (Beck, 1986).
In contrast to natural risks, technological risks are
created by human invention and innovation. They
directly result from the increasing power devolving
on mankind by scientific and technological progress.
It is therefore necessary that society is able to make a
conscious decision for or against entering into such
risks, even where there is scientific uncertainty over
the existence and extent of a specific risk.
The precautionary principle (PP) is a ‘principle
that requires public decision makers to take scientific
uncertainty seriously in the pursuit of the regulatory
goals of environmental and public health protection’
(Fisher and Harding, 2006, p. 115). Over the last
decades, the PP has gained importance in national
regulations (Williamson and Hulpke, 2000) and
international treaties for environmental protection
and sustainable development. A typical formulation
is included in Principle 15 of the Declaration of the
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (the ‘Rio Declaration’):
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely used by States according to
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious
and irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degrada-
tion (UNEP, 1992)
Wherever the PP has been used as a regulatory
framework so far, it is targeted at specific subjects of pro-
tection such as theozone layer, theNorthSea, the climate,
biodiversity, specific environmental compartments or
specific issues of public health (for a survey, see Fisher
et al., 2006; Som et al., 2004; Wiener, 2002; Williamson
and Hulpke, 2000). Only in exceptional cases does the
PP refer also to sources of impact such as persistent organic
pollutants or specific technologies.
In this article, we discuss the PP from the perspective
of technological development viewing new technol-
ogies and applications as sources of impact. In particular,
we address the new (digital) information and com-
munication technology (ICT). As recent technology
assessment studies have shown (Hilty et al., 2005a,
2006a; Oertel et al., 2005), future ICT applications will
be closely interwoven with social and environmental
change. Some intended applications of ICT have the
potential to induce socio-economically irreversible
developments. From this point of view, we argue that
the PP should be used to guide the development and
application of ICT to avoid irreversible developments.
Free space for thedecisions of future generations should
be preserved and technological lock-in avoided. In this
sense, the PP can serve as a framework for the devel-
opment of a sustainable information society, i.e. a
society making use of ICT in a way that is consistent
with the goal of sustainable development.
The article is organized as follows. We will first
show that the PP, traditionally targeted to environ-
mental and public health issues, needs to be
extended to social issues. This seems necessary since
there are technological developments with strong
social implications, in particular in the field of
(pervasive) ICT, usually discussed under the heading
of ‘information society’.
Second, we will clarify the relationship between
the PP and sustainability by retracing them to their
underlying ethical principles.
With the result of this analysis, we will return to
the information society issue and make a first attempt
to show how the PP could be used as a framework of
orientation to guide development in the direction of
a sustainable information society.
Finally, we will suggest applying the PP at the
business level with regard to corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) and corporate sustainability strategies.
The precautionary principle and social risks
The PP has thus far been basically implemented in
national regulations and international treaties for
environmental protection. However, technological
progress not only brings natural risks into the ambit
of human decision, but also creates new types of
risks. These risks can very often be seen as a potential
loss of social achievements.
Basic ethical arguments for extending the domain
of the precautionary principle to social risks
According to Van den Daele, the areas of damage
associated with the notion of risk (originally health
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and the environment) should be extended to include
social problems or changes in moral principles (Van
den Daele, 1991; quoted in Wiedemann and
Bru¨ggemann, 2001). Based on this extension of the
PP, even the possibility of a change in applicable
values would have to be treated as a risk and mini-
mized. The question therefore arises whether, on the
basis of current values, a possible change in values
ought to be regarded as an opportunity or a risk. In
any case, such processes should be given over to a
social discourse (in terms of Habermas, 2001), since it
would be an act of technological paternalism to
establish faits accomplis by introducing a technology
that implicitly stipulates moral standards without
any reflection on the subject. Even if a change in
applicable social values is viewed as an opportunity
or a risk, the possibility that this change is initi-
ated without a discourse must be considered a social
risk.
Building on this argument, Van den Daele (2001)
proposes using the PP to bring technological
development more firmly into the sphere of influ-
ence of politics and society. The PP is intended to
ensure that society is able to make a conscious and
autonomous decision for or against entering into
such risks, even where there is uncertainty regarding
the existence and extent of a risk.
Another argument for extending the PP to social
aspects is provided by Ashford, who highlights the
issue of fairness in the context of risk management:
‘The precautionary approach is the most appro-
priate basis for policy, even when large uncertain-
ties do not exist, especially where the fairness of the
distributions of costs and benefits of hazardous and
products are a concern’ (Ashford, 2005, p. 85).
Even if there is a high level of evidence (and
therefore not a ‘typical’ case for the PP), the social
risk of an unfair distribution of costs and benefits
should be treated with precaution to avoid viola-
tions of justice or equity.
Both the idea that technologies may interact with
society’s basic value system (that influence the
‘coordinate system’ in which the social discourse
evaluates opportunities and risks) and the idea that
fairness regarding the distribution of opportunities
and risks (potential benefits and costs) of new tech-
nologies needs to be protected become demonstra-
tive in the context of ICT impacts on society.
Specific arguments to apply the precautionary principle
to information society issues
Information and communication technologies are
usually associated with the buzzword ‘information
society’, which is not clearly defined. We use the
term ‘information society’ to denote the prospective
outcome of a structural change in society stimulated
by the close interaction between social practices and
ICT.
There are a number of information society issues
which have been discussed for decades. The history
of this discourse began in 1976, when the Interna-
tional Federation for Information Processing (IFIP),
the global umbrella association for computer pro-
fessional organizations, formed a Technical Com-
mittee to deal with ‘The Relationship between
Computers and Society’ (IFIP TC-9), which gave
the many national organizations the impetus to dis-
cuss the social responsibility (SR) of ICT professions
and to draw up ethical guidelines for their members.
A milestone was the adoption of the ‘Code of Ethics
and Professional Conduct’ by the Association for
Computing Machinery (ACM) in 1992.
The IFIP Ethics Task Group analysed 30 codes of
ethics or codes of conduct and formulated a frame-
work for the development of such ethical guidelines
by professional associations. An attempt was deliber-
ately not made to pursue the idea of aiming for a
uniform, globally applicable code (Berleur and
Brunnstein, 1996). After the Internet raised new
ethical issues, IFIP drew up the report on ‘Ethics and
the Governance of the Internet’ (Berleur et al., 1999).
From the broader context of this discourse, 11
subjects referring to potential ICT impacts on social
achievements emerged that repeatedly crop up be-
cause of the disagreements to which they give rise
(Table I).
These11 issues have entered the consciousness of the
(specialist) public as information technology has
developed from the mainframe computer era to the
current ICT paradigm dominated by personal com-
puters (PCs) and the Internet. They will not lose
importance in the future, quite the contrary. The
application of ICT is expected to become ‘pervasive’
within about a decade, that is, all aspects of daily life may
be influenced by networked ICT components. This
vision of future ICT application, called ‘pervasive
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computing’ or ‘ubiquitous computing’, involves the
miniaturization and embedding of microelectronics in
non-ICT objects and wireless networking, making
computers ubiquitous in the world around us.
Technology assessment studies (Hilty et al., 2004,
2005a; Ko¨hler and Som, 2005; Oertel et al., 2005)
have shown that pervasive computing would sig-
nificantly affect some of these issues, in particular:
• privacy
• security
• unmastered complexity
• digital divide
• autonomy, dependability and trust
Future applications of ICT are expected to interact
intensively with social practices, which may result in
profound changes to social rules and structures in the
near future. Some current developments can be
viewed as precursors of this development. One
example is the fact that privacy regulations are
increasingly difficult to implement because technol-
ogy is advancing faster than the legal system can react
to it. Another example is the potential of ICT to
bring about an ever-finer division of labour in a
globalized economy, which has substantial social
implications.
We conclude from these considerations that cur-
rent and future ICT applications induce social risks
that may be as severe as the environmental and public
health risks usually addressed by the PP. There is no
reason to exclude information society issues from the
domain of the PP, even if they have traditionally
focused on environment and public health issues.
By making this point, we are not ignoring the fact
that there are also relevant environmental effects of
ICT (some of which are ecologically desirable and
TABLE I
Eleven subjects referring to potential ICT impacts on social achievements (Hilty et al., 2005a, p. 40f)
Privacy Where does individual freedom to collect data end, in conflict with the right to information self-
determination (which stems from the principle of autonomy)?
Security What level of security for an information system needs to be guaranteed for it to be responsible to
use the system? Who is responsible for security flaws? Is it a criminal act or a service to society to
identify and publicize security flaws?
Unmastered
complexity
In the case of complex, and particularly distributed, information systems, it is generally not
possible to give a formal guarantee of certain properties of such systems. Does the increasing
dependence on such systems result in a loss of decision-making responsibility?
Free speech What are the limits of the right to free speech with respect to the use of electronic media, when it
comes into conflict with other fundamental rights? May or should there be censorship of Internet
content?
Intellectual
property
Where is the boundary between information as public property, which must be available to
everyone for reasons of social justice, and intellectual property, over which the owner has
autonomous control?
Digital divide The jeopardisation of social justice through the division of society into those who have access to
the information society and those who are excluded, e.g. low-income households, the elderly,
those with disabilities (also known as the ‘global digital divide’: the ICT gap between developed
and developing countries)
Education Changes to the education process through the use of ICT and the implications for social justice
Gender issues How does the use of ICT in the workplace and in private life change social justice between
genders?
Cultural diversity What effect does ICT have on social justice between different cultures (e.g. dominance of the
English language)? Will cultural diversity be preserved for future generations?
Cultural heritage Will future generations still be able to share in our knowledge if today’s digital storage media are
no longer readable in the future?
Autonomy,
dependability
and trust
Does the increasing dependence on ICT infrastructures threaten the autonomy of the individual?
Will we be forced, because of the complexity of structures, to trust without having sufficient
verification facilities?
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others not, see e.g. Hilty et al., 2006a; Ko¨hler and
Erdmann, 2004).
We therefore suggest using the PP as a framework
of orientation to guide the development of a sus-
tainable information society. Before making this
claim more explicit, we first clarify the relationship
between the PP and sustainable development.
The link between the precautionary principle
and sustainable development
The PP and the idea of sustainable development
share some common ethical grounds. We will first
describe each of them and then clarify their rela-
tionship with regard to underlying ethical princi-
ples.
The precautionary principle (PP)
The PP is used for dealing with environmental and
public health risks (and, according to newer inter-
pretations, social risks, as discussed above) in situa-
tions where there is no acute danger, but some
evidence for the existence of a relevant risk. Its
purpose is to minimize risks that may become evi-
dent only in the long term and to maintain a margin
for future developments.
However, the PP is interpreted very differently in
its various formulations. Because of the two extreme
points on a scale, it is possible to distinguish between
a weak and a strong version of the PP (Dorman,
2005; Sandin, 1999; Van den Daele, 2001):
• In the weak version of the PP, precautionary
measures are taken only where major, irre-
versible risks could occur and their scientific
level of proof is high. In addition, only pre-
cautionary measures that have low costs may
be taken.
• In the strong version of the PP (the other
extreme), precautionary measures should be
taken whenever there is any speculative evi-
dence of a risk. Neither does the risk have to
be high nor irreversible. Precautionary mea-
sures are taken irrespective of their costs (e.g.
losses resulting from not using a technology).
Table II gives a survey of the differences. The
discussion of the PP is connected to the issue of
potential errors that can be made in managing
unquantifiable risks. Under conditions of uncer-
tainty, a risk may be overestimated (‘Type I error’ or
‘false positive’) or underestimated (‘Type II error’ or
‘false negative’). The European Environmental
Agency (EEA, 2001) investigated the history of both
types of errors and found that there was a bias of
underestimating risks under conditions of uncer-
tainty. Kriebel et al. (2001) presented an overview of
scientific methodologies that skew scientific results
in the direction of underestimating risks.
According to Hansson (1999), the minimal ver-
sion of the PP consists in moving decision making in
the direction of risk neutrality. Other authors
advocate stronger versions of the PP and prefer
under particular conditions to err on the side of
caution (e.g. Kriebel et al., 2001). Hans Jonas (1979)
postulated the ‘priority of the bad forecast’, which
corresponds to the strong PP. In the situation of
TABLE II
Weak versus strong precautionary principle
Weak PP Strong PP
Precautionary measures are taken only
where
Precautionary measures are also taken
where
Extent of threat Major, irreversible risks might exist Minor, reversible risks might exist
Extent of uncertainty The scientific level of proof is high Only speculative evidence exists
Extent of action The costs for precautionary measures
must be low
The costs for precautionary measures
may be high
How mandatory is the
application of the PP?
Action may be taken Action must be taken
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uncertainty, Jonas gives precedence to the worst case
scenario and argues that the likelihood of successes in
technological development, as in evolution, is rather
small. On the other hand, evolution can make
numerous mistakes, since, unlike modern techno-
logical development, it moves forward in small steps.
In addition, Jonas refers to the inherent dynamics of
technical developments and poses the question as to
whether an existing situation is sufficiently undesir-
able that one should accept any risk to improve it
(Jonas, 1979, p. 75).
The variations of the PP laid down in laws and
international agreements lie somewhere between the
two extremes described above. The central question
still remains: what level of knowledge (or proof) of a
risk is sufficient to implement what precautionary
measures?
Additionally, the nature of uncertainty is changing.
Formerly, decision makers concentrated on the
magnitude of risk and their probability. Nowadays,
problems of indeterminacy and ignorance increas-
ingly characterize the risks society faces (Wynne,
1992). Policy makers must choose whether to err on
the side of caution or risk. The PP could be invoked
to ensure a fair decision-making process as much as to
prevent harm. Thus, instead of just waiting for sci-
entific results, policy makers should aim for a fair and
transparent democratic decision process and its
underlying instruments (Anon, 2005; Ashford, 2005).
Sustainable development
Sustainable development as a political goal has its
origins in the report by the World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED, 1987),
also known as the Brundtland report. The essence of
this idea is the combination of intragenerational and
intergenerational justice. The needs of people living
today should be satisfied throughout the world
(intragenerational justice) without this being to the
detriment of future generations (intergenerational
justice). Sustainability can therefore be understood as
an extension of the traditional principle of justice in
space and time, i.e. to the global dimension and to
the future.
The principles underlying the idea of sustainable
development are often termed as ‘sustainability’. Strictly
interpreted, sustainability would be revolutionary, as
Meyer-Abich (2001) observes. For this very reason,
he supposes, all politically relevant interpretations of
sustainability contain ‘an inherent guarantee that
there will be no consequences’ (Meyer-Abich, 2001,
p. 293).
During the 1990s two extreme interpretations of
sustainability emerged.
• Strong sustainability: The total natural capital of
the earth must be preserved, i.e. industry and
consumers, as users of nature, may live only off
the ‘interest’ of the natural capital. Using up
non-renewable resources would therefore be
ruled out and renewable resources could be used
only within the scope of their regeneration rate.
• Weak sustainability: The total anthropogenic
and natural capital of the earth must be pre-
served. This means that natural capital can
be reduced at will if, in return, human-cre-
ated capital of the same economic value is
substituted for it.
In the debates on the interpretation of sustainable
development as a political goal it has become
apparent that a possible consensus lies between the
two extremes and has to be found again and again.
Links between the precautionary principle
and sustainability from an ethical point of view
Rausch (1985) and Rehbinder (1991) recognize the
sustainability and PP as having the same intention:
not just to delay the overexploitation of nature, but
to prevent irreversible damage.
The final declaration from a conference cospon-
sored by Norway and the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe in 1990 stressed the role of
the PP as a necessary prerequisite for sustainable
development:
In order to achieve sustainable development, policies
must be based on the PP […] Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postpon-
ing measures to prevent environmental degradation
(Bergen Declaration, 1990).
Norton (1992) regards the PP as a way of protecting
sustainability from its feared ineffectiveness. This
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shows that the PP is regarded as one of the important
frameworks needed to implement the goal of sus-
tainable development.
What are the ethical arguments behind this view?
How can the PP and the pursuit of sustainability be
justified on the grounds of basic ethical principles?
Table III shows our attempt to map the main reasons
given for (weak or strong) precautionary measures
and for the pursuit of (weak or strong) sustainability
to the following basic ethical principles: beneficence
(do good), non-maleficence (do no harm), justice
and respect for autonomy (or self-determination). It
is important to note that justice here includes both
intra- and intergenerational justice, the latter
addressing the issue that ‘…present generations may
be obligated by considerations of justice not to
pursue policies that create benefits for themselves but
impose costs on those who will live in the future’
(Meyer, 2003, Introduction).
The numbering in the first column of Table III
corresponds to the numbering of the following
explanations.
1. A weak PP justifies a precautionary measure
(such as the ban of a new technology or appli-
cation) by referring to the irreversibility of the
risk. This means that accepting the risk that is
supposed to be induced by the new technol-
ogy or application, if it actually exists, will
create an irreversible situation for society. The
irreversibility argument implicitly refers to the
principle of intergenerational justice, because
a potentially infinite number of people living
in the future will be affected.
2. Besides irreversibility, a weak PP requires an
additional argument to justify a precautionary
measure. The cost of the measure should be
low. In most practical cases, most of the cost
will be the opportunity cost of not applying
the technology, i.e. the cost of not doing
something good that could be done other-
wise. We conclude that this argument
implicitly refers to the beneficence principle
(do good). Furthermore, avoiding the use of
a technology by regulation can also create
the ideational cost of denying potential users
of their free choice, a frequent argument
referring to the autonomy principle.
3. A strong PP, besides accepting the justifica-
tions of the weak PP, also accepts weaker
arguments to justify a precautionary measure.
One of them is the argument that there is a
relevant delay between cause and (the sup-
posed harmful) effect. If the supposed risk
exists, the delay explains why there is no
empirical evidence for it thus far. This argu-
ment clearly assumes that it is better to err
on the side of caution to avoid harm and
thus refers to the non-maleficence principle
(do no harm).
4. Another argument accepted in the context of
the strong PP is that there would be an unfair
distribution of opportunities and risks induced
by the technology in case the risk actually
exists: some people would benefit from the
opportunities and others would bear the risk.
This argument obviously refers to the princi-
ple of (distributional or social) justice.
5. Another common argument is the involun-
tariness of entering the risk. For example, it
would not be acceptable to force people to
have an electronic signature (which could
potentially be misused), but there are no eth-
ical objections against the voluntary use of
this new technology. This argument refers to
the autonomy principle.
6. Weak sustainability requires one to compen-
sate for destroyed capital (of any kind) by
creating capital. This addresses the principle
of intergenerational justice (pass on at least
the same amount of capital you have inher-
ited) and to the beneficence principle,
since creating man-made capital is viewed as
‘doing good’ to others and may even go
beyond the necessary compensation for
destruction.
7. Strong sustainability requires one to preserve
the capital that cannot be recovered (e.g.
non-renewable resources or biodiversity).
This refers to the principle of intergenera-
tional justice as above, but without the far-
reaching assumption of ‘full convertibility’ of
capital. Since natural capital cannot generally
be replaced by man-made capital, preserving
it also means ‘doing no harm’ and therefore
refers to non-maleficence.
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Both weak and strong sustainabilities also address
intragenerational justice, but do not differ in this
respect.
We can conclude from this analysis that the
common ground of the PP and sustainability is the
principle of justice behind intergenerational justice,
in particular, i.e. the maxim that we should not
pursue policies that create benefits for us but impose
costs on those who will live in the future. The
weaker and the stronger interpretations of both the
PP and sustainability differ in their bias towards
the ‘do good’ principle (weaker versions) or the ‘do
no harm’ principle (stronger versions). The principle
to respect the autonomy of the individual is used
both by the weak and the strong PP, in the former
case against precaution and in the latter in favour of it.
The main result of this analysis is that intergen-
erational justice is not only the core of sustainability,
but also of the PP. This view is supported by the
so-called free space theory of the PP (Beyer, 1992;
Ko¨chlin, 1989). According to this theory, the PP is
intended to preserve free space for the decisions and
activities of future generations. This applies, for
example, to future activities that pollute the envi-
ronment in that the admissible environmental pol-
lution (according to some defined risk limit) is not
exhausted. Furthermore, it may also be rational to
keep free space for the consequences of a modified
perception and evaluation of potential impacts, since
risk acceptance, the state of scientific knowledge,
social values and regulations change over time (‘risk
of change’). Side effects of technologies that are re-
garded as unobjectionable today may be regarded as
unacceptable damage tomorrow.
Thus, irreversibility can be used as a criterion
essential to operationalizing the PP (see Hilty et al.,
2004). As we will show in the following section, the
criterion can help to identify information society
issues that require precautionary measures.
The precautionary principle as a framework
for a sustainable information society
Social aspects of ICT are to a great extent issues of
potentially irreversible developments. The concept
of irreversibility we are referring to is not the one of
natural science (which can be traced back to the
second law of thermodynamics), but a weaker, albeit
relevant concept of irreversibility
The diffusion of a technology may be reversible in
theory, but irreversible in practice. Once a technology
has been propagated, the costs to the national
economy of adjusting the course of the trend can be
very high – if the legal requirements for such an
adjustment are satisfied at all. In such cases, we speak
of socio-economic irreversibility.
Situations of socio-economic irreversibility are
also known as ‘lock-in’ situations (Rammel, 2003;
Rip et al., 1995). Several reasons for lock-ins are
discussed in the literature:
TABLE III
The ethical principles underlying different interpretations of the precautionary principle and sustainability
Justification Do good Do no harm Justice Autonomy
Weak PP
1. Irreversibility of risk x
2. Low cost of measure x x
Strong PP
3. Delay between cause and effect x
4. Unfair distribution of opportunity and risk x
5. Involuntariness of risk x
Weak sustainability
6. Compensate for the destruction of capital x x
Strong sustainability
7. Preserve irrecoverable capital x x
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• The rising cost of shifting to alternatives.
• The expected return on investment: Invest-
ments in research and development are
strong drivers of sales; private-sector compa-
nies need to sell their new products to get
the return on their investments.
• Adoption by users: Numerous users accus-
tomed to a technology probably do not want
to give it up (such as the QWERTY key-
board).
With respect to socio-economic irreversibility,
the combination of the characteristics of pervasive
computing shown in Table IV is relevant (Hilty
et al., 2005a).
These characteristics of pervasive ICT establish
the socio-economic irreversibility of this technol-
ogy, which makes it a likely candidate for application
of the PP. In addition, there is also an aspect of
physical irreversibility, since the production of ICT
requires some scarce elements (such as indium),
which are almost irreversibly dissipated as compo-
nents of electronic waste (Wa¨ger et al., 2005;
Widmer et al., 2005). Besides that, it should be
noted that ICT can also be applied for the benefit of
sustainable development (Hilty et al., 2005b; Ko¨hler
and Som, 2005). If all types of environmental im-
pacts of ICT are taken into account, the overall
effect seems to be ambivalent, i.e. depending on the
framework conditions under which ICT is applied
(Hilty et al., 2006a; Ko¨hler and Erdmann, 2004).
Two basic approaches to applying the PP to ICT
developments can be derived from our discussion of
the PP in ‘The link between the precautionary
principle and sustainable development’ section
above. The first approach is to keep as much space
for future development open as possible, since we
cannot anticipate today what the needs of future
generations will be. This means, on the one hand,
preventing irreversible damages to the environment,
human health and social achievements, and, on the
other hand, keeping open technological develop-
ment trajectories and avoiding path-dependencies
(Rammel, 2003).
For the development of new ICT, such an
approach should include:
• Preferring open standards for all types of
interfaces among ICT products to proprietary
standards, because they are essential for avoid-
ing strong path dependency and trends
towards market dominance, which destroy
fair competition and diversity.
• Preferring less complex technical solutions to
more complex ones, because unmastered
technical complexity fosters investment in
analysis and adaptation, which fosters the
path dependency of the development.
The second approach is participation (for an
overview, see Joss and Bellucci, 2002; Renn et al.,
2003; UNESCO and COMEST, 2005), i.e.
involving stakeholders in a dialogue on the devel-
opment and application of novel technologies. It is
known to aid in detecting early warnings, assessing
technical alternatives, preventing conflicts and
developing safer products (Fergus and Rowney,
2005; Jeurissen, 2004; WBGU, 1998).
A stakeholder dialogue on technology develop-
ment could even lead to a ‘new production of
technology’ yielding ‘socially robust technology’ (as
opposed to only technically robust technology), in
analogy to Novotny’s concept of the ‘new produc-
tion of knowledge’ or ‘Mode 2 science’ leading to
‘socially robust knowledge’ (Novotny et al., 2001,
2003). In the field of ICT, society is far away from
an informed stakeholder dialogue. As the UN World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2005
has shown once again, the rebound effects of ICT
(Hilty, 2006; Hilty et al., 2006b) and other potential
side effects are widely ignored and naı¨ve political
ideas such as ‘poverty reduction by ICT’ or ‘access
for all’ promoted.
The PP can be used as a general framework to
guide policy makers at any level to give their
information society policies an ethical orientation.
Give preference to open standards and to less com-
plex technology and create opportunities for an
informed stakeholder dialogue. These precautionary
measures will help to avoid lock-in and to preserve
free space for the decisions of future generations.
The precautionary principle at the business
level
If the PP is to be effective in avoiding social, envi-
ronmental and public health risks of new technologies
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such as pervasive ICT, it should also be incorporated
into the business strategies of companies developing
ICT and its applications. For their long-term success,
a stakeholder dialogue about information society is-
sues is crucial. It is usually easier and cheaper to avoid
unsustainable development paths at an early stage of
the innovation chain.
From a business-ethical point of view, applying
the PP to technological innovation is an issue of
CSR. However, the CSR debate has only rarely
addressed this issue thus far. As Rip notes, ‘CSR
now starts to include technology and innovation’
(Rip, 2005). Viewed from a PP perspective, tech-
nology and innovation are much more relevant than
the company’s daily operational business, which is
often the focus of CSR activities. However, there is
no approach so far to integrate precautionary strat-
egies in management methodology beyond the
consideration of ‘hard’ liability issues (which was one
of the early ideas of CSR, Votaw, 1972). In order to
develop such an approach, in particular for the ICT
industry, would be a task for future research. A first
step towards this goal could be to put a reference to
the PP in ISO 26000, a designation of the future
International Standard giving guidance on SR.
The PP is not just another add-on extending the
list of management approaches such as quality
(i.e. ISO 9000, EFQM), knowledge management
(i.e. intellectual capital), environmental management
(i.e. ISO 14000, EMAS), risk management (i.e. ISO
25700, in preparation) or CSR (i.e. SA 8000, AA
1000) (Maxwell et al., 2006). These approaches are
already lacking integration in traditional manage-
ment systems. In just the same way as they should be
part of an overall sustainability strategy (as Bieker
et al., 2001, propose) they should be geared to the
PP. As we have shown above, the ethics
behind sustainability and the PP is very similar. If
one accepts the prediction that sustainability is one
of the salient issues managers will face over the
coming years (Bieker et al., 2001; Gauthier, 2005;
Isenmann and Lenz, 2004; Morimoto et al., 2005;
Steurer et al., 2005), the PP should comprise part of
the sustainability strategy of a company, because it
emphasises the issue of socio-economic irreversibil-
ity in a technology development context – an issue
which appears undervalued in the traditional
approaches to sustainability.
Conclusion
We have presented arguments for extending the PP
from mainly environmental and health domains to
include social subjects for protection. One main
reason for this claim is the self-apparent interaction
between ICT development and information society
issues; there precaution is needed to bring technology
TABLE IV
Characteristics of pervasive computing that foster socio-economic irreversibility
Mass consumer technology ICT components will increasingly be embedded in everyday objects
Interconnection of the
physical world and the
virtual world
There is a trend to interconnect the physical world (world of things) with the virtual world
(world of data) in real time, that is, more and more data will be synchronized with physical
processes via sensors, and vice versa via actuators. The opportunities this synchronization
brings about for the organization of production and consumption processes tend to make
pervasive computing a new critical infrastructure
Compatibility The diffusion of novel ICT depends heavily on compatibility issues. The requirement that
new ICT products remain compatible with existing ones narrows the range of future
development trajectories considerably. The compatibility issue also compromises compe-
tition in the ICT sector by creating ‘winner takes all’ (WTA) market structures, an effect
which further reduces the open space for future developments
Complexity Pervasive ICT systems form complex distributed systems. Such a system may exhibit
emergent properties which have not been intended or foreseen by its designer and cannot
be controlled, because there is no designer of the system as such. Society will be increas-
ingly forced to rely on unmastered distributed systems because switching them off or
reorganizing them will have unpredictable consequences
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development under better societal control and to
avoid socio-economically irreversible developments.
Our analysis of the PP and sustainability has shown
that these two ideas share some common ground: the
goal of preserving free space for the decisions of future
generations. Due to the close relationship between
the PP and sustainable development, the PP can be
regarded as a general framework for policy makers at
all levels to support the goal of sustainable develop-
ment, in particular to reconcile information society
and sustainability policies, targeting a sustainable
information society. Furthermore, the PP as a
framework of orientation should become a part of
corporate strategies for companies in the ICT sector,
if not in all sectors developing new technologies with
a potential for deep societal change.
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